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Changing Your Mind: The Law of Regretted
Decisions
By E. Allan Farnsworth
Reviewed by Richard E. Speidel*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Changing Your Mind: The Law of Regretted Decisions' is a literate
and beautifully written book. The author, Professor E. Allan
Farnsworth, stands at the pinnacle of American contract law
scholarship. 2 His subtle and illuminating analysis focuses on problems
that are important to all of us: When is a person free to renege on a
promise, a relinquishment, or a preclusion? His solutions, which draw
upon history, philosophy, the social sciences, and legal principles
derived from a number of legal contexts, including contract, property,
and the law of trusts, support the increased power of people to create or
alter legal relationships by expressing an intention to do so.
The book is divided into two parts. The first part consists of eleven
chapters exploring the legal restraints imposed on a promisor who
regrets the decision to promise and reneges on a commitment made to a
promisee. When is the promise binding in law? Why should any
promise be binding? If binding, what is the strength of the obligation in
terms of remedies available to the promisee? These questions are
important in moral and legal philosophy and are at the core of a first

.

Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.

1. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS

(Yale Univ. Press, 1998).
2. The author, E. Allan Farnsworth, is an Alfred McCormack Professor of Law at Columbia
University School of Law. He is an accomplished teacher and lecturer, co-author of leading
casebooks in contracts and commercial law, and author of an influential treatise on contract law
and countless law review and journal articles. He was the Reporter for the American Law
Institute's Second Restatement of Contracts and a participant in the shaping of both the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts. He remains a well-connected and influential
consultant, expert witness, and occasional arbitrator on the domestic and international scenes.
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year course in contracts and the work of lawyers and courts in litigating
3
claims of promissory liability and remedy.
The second part consists of nine chapters that deal with what the
author calls "relinquishments," which includes things such as
performing a duty, giving a gift, discharging a debt, and waiving a
condition, and "preclusions," whether by equitable estoppel, laches,
rejection, election, or prescription. Unlike promises, relinquishments
and preclusions alter the present state of affairs rather than commit to
the future. When is a person who reneges on a relinquishment or a
preclusion bound even though there has been no consideration or
induced reliance? Courts have tended to treat relinquishments and
preclusions as disparate problems at the margins of contract law.
Professor Farnsworth employs an innovative analysis to integrate the
subject matter and resolve the question of regret.
According to the author, the answers to these questions depend upon
which of several overlapping principles control. For example, many
promises, whether made in a bargain or not, are binding because of the
"reliance" principle. Behind the reliance principle, however, resides the
so-called "intention" principle, which is a manifested intention to
assume a legal obligation or to alter existing legal relationships.
Throughout part one and the chapters on relinquishments, a central
argument is that beyond the areas covered by the reliance principle, a
manifested intention to create or alter legal relationships should be
binding. Further, Professor Farnsworth argues that the legal paternalism
underlying the current refusal to recognize the intention principle should
be softened if not rejected.
This Review focuses upon commitments and relinquishments and the
interaction between the reliance principle, the intention principle, and

3. For different perspectives on this area of inquiry, see generally CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981); GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995); JAMES GORDLEY, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991); HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST,
THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT (1961); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF
CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT
LAW (1997); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACT RELATIONS (1980); W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH
CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW (1996). Grant Gilmore's stimulating book, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT, first published in 1974, was reissued by the Ohio State University Press in
1995 under the editorship of Ronald K. L. Collins and was the subject of Symposium,
Reconsidering GrantGilmore's The Death of Contract,90 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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Changing Your Mind
It will conclude with a brief treatment of

II.

COMMITMENTS

A. Background Principles
Before exploring Professor Farnsworth's theory, some background is
in order. At least three major overlapping themes can be identified in
contract law. I will call them "Autonomy," "Efficiency," and
"Fairness."
The Autonomy theme supports the principle that there can be no
contractual obligation without a promise. 6 People are free to promise or
not, and when promises are made, promisors have power to condition
their commitments. Nevertheless, the exercise of Autonomy alone is
not enough; without more, a promise, even when accompanied by the
formality of a signed writing, does not create a legal obligation.
The Efficiency theme is implicit in one of the recognized reasons for
enforcing promises, consideration.7 Consideration for a promise must
be bargained for and given in exchange for the promise and may consist
of a return promise, an act or forbearance. Reciprocity is required.
Thus, in an agreed exchange of resources, the promises or performances
of both parties must be bargained for and given in exchange for each
other. 8 A noted scholar once observed that consideration is both a
process of bargaining and an agreed exchange. 9 It is the countless
agreed exchanges in private markets that allocate resources and
determine, in large part, the distribution of income in our society.' 0 On
the other hand, a sham bargain, i.e., a gift promise that exacts

4. See infra PartlI,In.
5. See infra Part H.
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
7. "Efficiency" concepts are central to theories about law and economics. For a helpful
discussion, see Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The
Integration of FairnessInto Efficiency, 73 WASH, L. REv. 249, 266-88 (1998) (discussing the
application of theoretical economics to the court system to increase fairness while retaining
efficiency).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71-75 (1981).
9. See Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration,58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 932-33
(1958).
But see Howard Engelskirchen, Consideration as the Commitment to Relinquish
Autonomy, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 490, 493 (1997) (arguing that consideration is best
understood as a relinquishment of autonomy).
10. Enforcing promises in an agreed exchange arguably supports both Autonomy and
promotes Efficiency. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 71-90
(1997); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 164-87 (1991).
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unbargained for or "nominal" consideration, involves a process but not

a bargained for exchange. Hence, it is not binding."1
The Fairness themes 12 in contract emerge in several situations and
perform different functions. In agreed exchanges, Fairness themes
protect against disproportion. A court may protect a promisor where
duress, mistake, fraud, or alleged unconscionability have impaired the
process of bargaining by limiting the promisor's information or choice.
Given these impairments and the resulting disproportion in the
exchange, there is less reason to protect the Efficiency implicit in the
power of the parties to fix their own values. 13 Here, Fairness trumps
Efficiency and limits Autonomy.
In promises without consideration, Fairness themes are invoked to
enforce the promise to prevent injustice to the promisee. A prime
example is found in the famous section 90 of the Restatement, Second:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy
14
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Section 90 is usually invoked to preclude regret where gift promises
rather than bargains are involved. The theory is that unbargained for

reliance should not be used to substitute for an invited or required
acceptance that was not given before the promisor reneged.' 5

The

11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c, illus. 6 (1981); see also,
Comment, Restatement of Contracts (Second)--A Rejection of Nominal Consideration,1 VAL. U.
L. REv. 102, 113 (1966) (supporting the draft of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
that states that nominal consideration makes a promise unenforceable as a contract).
12. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 7, at 288-304 (discussing justice as fairness).
13. The usual rule is that if the "requirement of consideration is met there is no additional
requirement of ... equivalence in the values exchanged." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 79(b) (1981); see Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097
(N.Y. 1993) ("[A]bsent fraud or unconscionability adequacy of consideration is not a proper
subject for judicial scrutiny."); see also James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV.
547 (1995) (arguing, passim, that corrective justice (fairness) is a necessary corrective in a society
where exchange is an integral part of distributive justice (efficiency)). For a discussion of the law
where changed circumstances during performance create disproportion in the exchange, see Larry
A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century's
EquitableReformation of ContractLaw, 33 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 267 (1999).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
15. For example, A makes an offer to B and invites acceptance by a promise to perform. B,
induced by the conditional promise in the offer, expends money in preparing to perform but does
not accept by promise before A revokes the offer. Here, the reliance does not substitute for the
bargained for acceptance. As Judge Learned Hand once said, "there is no room in such a
situation for the doctrine of promissory estoppel." James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc., 64
F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933).
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reliance theme, however, cannot be so easily contained. Thus, in
proposed bargains, reliance in preparing to perform or making part
performance has been used to create option contracts to avoid
injustice. 16 In some cases, it has been used to protect a relying promisee
even though the negotiations fail to conclude a contract. 17 But, as
Professor Robert A. Hillman's recent exhaustive case study has
demonstrated, 18 reliance (Fairness) has not yet swallowed up bargain
(Efficiency).
Even though the reliance interest appears to be
pervasive, 19 Hillman concludes that a promise (Autonomy) may be
binding because of either consideration (Efficiency) or induced reliance
(Fairness).
Fairness themes are also invoked where a promise without
consideration or induced reliance is made in recognition of a benefit
previously received by the promisor from the promisee. Under section
86 of the Restatement, Second, this promise may be "binding to the
extent necessary to prevent injustice." 20 Here, it is the moral obligation
created by the past benefit conferred (unjust enrichment), rather than the
moral obligation arising from making the promise, that justifies liability.
Even so, the promise is not binding if the benefit was conferred as a gift
or to the extent that the value of the promise is disproportionate to the
benefit received. 2
At this point we return to Autonomy. As previously noted, a "naked"
promise is not binding even though clearly expressed in a signed
writing. Unless there is enabling legislation, there are no formalities
that a promisor can invoke to make a gift promise binding even though
the promisor expresses an intention to assume a legal obligation.

16. A recent example is Ragosta v. Wilder, 592 A.2d 367 (Vt. 1997), which held that a
promise that induces action "of definite and substantial character" may be enforceable under a
theory of promissory estoppel when enforcement is necessary to avoid injustice.
17. These and other problems are well discussed in Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and
Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385
(1999).
18. See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An
Empiricaland Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 618-19 (1998) (concluding that courts

do not enforce promises without either a bargain or reliance).
19. For the last word (to date) on the pervasive scope of reliance (fairness) in contract law, see
Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of PromissoryEstoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191

(1998).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981).

21. See id. § 86(2). For some illuminating history and a penetrating critique of the "moral
obligation" doctrine, see Geoffrey R. Watson, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v. Wyman
Reconsidered,71 TUL. L. REV. 1749 (1997).
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This limitation on power to contract has bothered scholars, if not the
courts. In fact, there are several examples in recent literature urging a
reform in the direction of increased power to expressly assume legal
obligations in gift promises. 22 But, as the law now stands, "neither real
nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to
the formation of a contract." 23 Thus, a promise supported by
consideration is enforceable even though the promisor does not also
manifest an intention to assume a legal obligation. On the other hand,
"a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal
relations may prevent the formation of a contract" 24 and, in certain
cases, the intention of both parties to contract may support contract
formation even if material terms are left open or to be agreed.2 5
It is against this background and these themes that Professor
Farnsworth writes.
B. ProfessorFarnsworth'sTheory
1. The Promise Requirement
Farnsworth embraces promise as the fundamental behavior upon
which contract law is based. At the beginning of the book, there is
some useful discussion about when a promise is made, how a promise
should be distinguished from both the decision to promise and a
resolution 26 and, later, there is an insightful discussion of when a person
may be liable for conduct that creates dependence even though a
promise cannot be found. 27 The promise, however, is treated as the

22. Notable is Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986). Professor Barnett believes that unless a promisor intends to assume a legal obligation,
there should be no contract even though consideration or induced reliance are present. See id. at
319; see also Knapp, supra note 19, at 1233-44 (criticizing a recent author's attempts to utilize
reliance as merely a factor in determining reliable promises); Watson, supra note 21, at 17971804 (promoting the enforcement of moral obligation promises regardless of the existence of

consideration).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981).
24. Id. For a survey of agreements opting out of legal obligation and their effect, see Herbert
Bernstein & Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman's Agreement in Legal Theory and Modem Practice:
United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 87 (1998) (Supplement).

25. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978).
26. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 9-17.
27. See id. at 89-98. This is the only place where the principles of relational contracts,
pioneered by Professor Ian R. Macneil and others, are mentioned and then only in passing.
Relational contract theorists usually downplay the importance of promises, particularly in long
term relationships where the promise cannot contain all of the material terms of the deal. See Ian
R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 495508 (criticizing "promise-centered" theories).
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fundamental starting place for a law of obligation based upon
Autonomy. But when does a promise create a contractual obligation?
2. Defenses to Binding Promises
Before confronting this question, the author briefly treats the defenses
28
to liability for failure to perform a promise in a bargain that is binding.
Given the fact that the dispute arises because the promisor reneges, the
usual posture is that the promisee, who is in a position to complain,
asserts a claim and the promisor seeks to avoid liability by defending on
the ground that there are excuses that justify reneging on the binding
promise. In this "freedom from" contract posture, under current law the
promisor will win, even if there is a binding promise, if the court
accepts certain excuses for regretting that the promise was made. It is
here that Fairness themes emerge to limit the effect of Autonomy and
Efficiency in bargains.
One set of Fairness excuses is that the decision to promise was
unfairly influenced by coercion or misrepresentation, or uninformed due
to mistake, or ill-considered because of cognitional or volitional
deficiencies at the time it was made. These defects in the process of
deciding to promise impair the promisor's
information or choice and
29
regret.
the
excuse
to
court
a
persuade
may
Another set of excuses is that with the passage of time, the promisor
views the decision to promise as improvident due to unanticipated
changed circumstances or obsolete as a result of changed preferences.
Thus, a seller at a fixed price may regret the promise because of an
unanticipated increase in the market price of the goods. Likewise, a
buyer of described goods may regret the promise because she no longer
30
needs the goods.
Farnsworth claims that to the extent a court accepts any of these
excuses, it is being paternalistic, i.e., imposing legal limitations on "a
person's control over the future for that person's own good, usually in
the context of the extent of a person's freedom to make a commitment
that will be irrevocable." 3 1 But, after fewer than ten pages of analysis
28. Assuming that the promise is supported by consideration, this is the theme of Fairness
aimed at preventing uninformed or pressured disproportion.
29. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 18-24.
30. See id. at 24-27.
31. Id. at 3 n.5. Although the concept of paternalism is invoked repeatedly throughout the
book, this is the only definition or explanation provided. Dean Anthony Kronman's pioneering
work, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983), is cited, but the
discussion is limited to Kronman's concept of regret. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 20 &
209-10 n. 7. In fact, there is a rich literature on paternalism that debates the relationship between
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and no discussion of the paternalist's friend, the doctrine of
unconscionability, he concludes that "only rarely will a court allow you
to change your mind and renege on a binding promise, though there is a
trend toward tolerance of reneging and in this sense toward
paternalism." 32 He then makes a "fair" guess that "the more
paternalistic the courts are in allowing excuses for reneging on binding
promises, the more willing they will be to find binding promises in the
first place." 33 The implication is that because the excuses recognized
for reneging on binding promises are very limited (less paternalistic),
the courts will be less willing to find binding promises in the first place
(more paternalistic). But then, leaving this intriguing guess and the
unexplored concept of legal paternalism, 34 he turns to the question of
when a promise is legally binding. This, for him, is the more important
question.
3. When is a Promise Binding?
Before considering when a promise is binding, the author explores
when a promise expresses commitment. 35 Typically, a promise
expresses commitment by an objective expression to a promisee of a
commitment to do or not to do something in the future. It is not a
representation about the present, a prophecy or an unexpressed
intention. It is usually not about events beyond the promisor's control
and is made to a promisee or for the benefit of a third person. The
expressed commitment constitutes assent (Autonomy), which is a
necessary undergirding of promissory liability. This helpful discussion

Autonomy, Efficiency, and Fairness. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 147-63 (1993); David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and
Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 572-75 (1988) (favoring paternalistic intervention by the
legislature rather than the courts); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism,84 VA. L. REV.
229, 284-86 (1998) (arguing that paternalistic interventions are not necessarily inefficient). None
of this literature is cited or discussed.
32. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 27.
33. Id. at 20. This is the "easy in, easy out" theory of liability. The "guess" is never
systematically developed.
34. One might forgive, yea even applaud, the omission of unconscionability in the discussion
of excuses because of the diversity of the sources cited in Chapter 2. I am puzzled, however, by
both the positioning (too early) and the treatment (too limited) of the excuse discussion.
Traditional excuse discussion fits after it is determined that the promise (Autonomy) is supported
by consideration (Efficiency) and the attention turns to disproportion (Fairness). Efficiency

themes, such as the importance of risk allocation, are downplayed in this discussion or, perhaps,
muted by the unitary treatment of paternalism.
35.

See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 28-35.
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sets the stage for the fundamental question: Why should a promise
36
bind?
In Chapter 4, Farnsworth recognizes that because of the practices of
promising in society and the rules that the practice generates, a promisor
can be bound by a contract even though there was no expressed
intention to assume a legal obligation. 37 This is particularly true in
bargain contracts. But he pushes for a deeper explanation of why
promises bind and presents the refreshing and, in my opinion, sound
conclusion that "no single explanation will suffice and that the answer is
a complex mix of explanations that focus on both promisor and
38
promisee."
In focusing on the promisor, Farnsworth introduces the intention
principle, under which the promisor's manifested intention to be legally
bound should be the reason for a binding promise. The Autonomy
principle recognizes the importance to the promisor of the power to
make a binding promise. But, as previously noted, intention alone is not
a sufficient reason to make a promise binding. Farnsworth argues that
in certain situations it should be. 39 By returning to a pervasive theme,
he suggests that by declining to recognize the power of a promisor to
intend to assume a legal obligation, courts and contract law again
indulge in legal paternalism. In sum, the intention principle is a strong
Autonomy power that should, in most cases, outweigh paternalistic
concerns.40
In focusing on the promisee, the author gets to the heart of the matter.
Yes, a promise creates expectations in a promisee and these
expectations may be reasonable. But the core to obligation is reliance

36. See id. at 36-42.
37. See id. at 36-37.
38. Id. at 27.
39. See id. at 38. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for obligation that a promisor intend to
assume legal obligations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981). Professor
Randy Barnett, however, has argued that an expressed intent to assume a legal obligation should
be required even though the promise has consideration or induces reliance. See Barnett, supra
note 22, at 271-91, 310-12 (assessing the flaws in current contract theories and favoring the use of
a "consent" theory). Although Barnett's work is cited, supra note 22, the extent to which
Barnett's "consent" theory is consistent with the "intention" principle and inconsistent with the
"reliance" principle is not discussed.
40. One wonders whether paternalism is the only reason for refusing to recognize the intention
principle. There appears to be no public demand for this formalistic avenue to increased contract
liability. The lack of pressure for legal reform may reflect a judgment that there are no Efficiency
gains from the move or that the moral obligation created by making the promise and a variety of
non-legal sanctions in every context give promisees all of the protection (Fairness) that they need.
Neither of these reasons, if plausible, reflect concern about the ability of promisors to protect
themselves.
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by the promisee on the promise rather than the reasonable expectations
created by the promise. This is the "reliance" principle, which
Farnsworth traces to the Roman jurist Papinian, who stated that "[n]o
one can change his mind to someone else's disadvantage. "' 4 1 Put
differently, reasonable expectations created by a promise may be a precondition to obligation but they are not sufficient alone. Rather, a
promisor's "power to make a binding promise turns on the reliance it
induces, rather than the expectations it arouses." 42 He continues:
If protection of reliance is not logically inescapable, it is at least practically beyond question. People in the workaday world want to and do
rely on promises and have come to view promises as reliable. Legal
protection of reliance on them is seen as essential. Hence a reliance
principle, under which a promise results in a commitment if the
promisor should reasonably
expect the promisee to rely on it and if
43
such reliance ensues.

4. Consideration
a. An Emerging Theory
At this point, the outline of the author's theory about the law of
regretted promises, apart from the scope of the intention principle, is in
place." Assent by the promisor in the form of a promise is essential for
obligation in contract (Autonomy). But, an expressed intention to
assume legal obligations (the intention principle) is not required if other
requirements, such as consideration (Efficiency), are satisfied. In
contrast, an expressed intention to assume a legal obligation is not
sufficient by itself. An expressed intention not to assume legal
obligations, however, may be effective. The primary justification for
making a promise binding is reliance by the promisee (the reliance
principle) and, where consideration is present, reliance both protects the
promisee (Fairness) and indirectly supports the market (Efficiency).
Farnsworth argues that protection of the reliance principle "will not
only protect past reliance but will encourage future reliance" and this
will promote "a party's investment in specific relationships, investment
that will make a party better off if the other party performs the contract
but worse off it the other party does not." 45 Finally, the author suggests

41.
42.

FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 41-42.

43. Id. at 42. Note how the emphasis has shifted from the power of the promisor to what the
promisor should reasonably expect.
44. He states that there has been a "discussion of theory" in the first four chapters. See id.
45. Id.
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that a rational basis for a large part of the universe of enforceable
promises is the "attenuated doctrine of consideration, supported by the
reliance principle and its corollary, the assent rule." 46 What does this
mean?
b. Attenuated Consideration
Why is the consideration requirement attenuated? According to
Farnsworth, the gradual demise of form and formalities as reasons for
enforcing promises left consideration as the primary, if not exclusive,
requirement for a binding promise. Reviewing some history, he
suggests that eliminating the seal undercut the intention principle and
represented a paternalistic legal judgment that it was not in the best
interests of the promisor to have such power. 47 As the exclusive
requirement, however, consideration simply was not a satisfactory test
for distinguishing the enforceable from the unenforceable promise.
Assuming that a swap was likely to be involved, the early definition of
consideration as either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment, worked
to identify reliance by the promisee as an important interest. But this
neat formula became enmeshed in the snarls of circularity when courts
at the end of the 16th century recognized that consideration could be a
promise exchanged for a promise. Where was the detriment in simply
making a promise? 48 Suppose there was no reliance in fact.
Professor Farnsworth describes the gradual emergence of the
requirement that the detriment be bargained for as the price for the
promise (and vice versa) as a test rather than a theory. According to the
author, the test "has produced scarcely a ripple outside of academe"
49
because the "bargain test is usually satisfied without serious question."
He claims further that the "requirement of a bargained-for-exchange
never assumed great practical significance in commercial life, 50 and
that courts have exhibited a disinclination to monitor either the
bargaining process or the substance of the agreed exchange. This
apathy toward consideration results in an attenuated requirement of
consideration. More importantly, if anything bargained for, such as a

46. Id. at 65.
47. See id. at 46.
48. See id at 46-47. He asserts that "the notion of detriment to the promisee became
remarkably attenuated." Id. at 47.
49. Id. at 48. "And since you do not usually need to bargain for something unless it is a
detriment to the promisee, if the new test of bargain is satisfied, so usually is the old one of
detriment." Id.
50. Id. at 49.
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peppercorn, is consideration for a promise, then the notion of
reliance
51
also has "become so attenuated as to be scarcely recognizable."
Indeed, the author notes that rare is the transaction in which there
lingers the slightest doubt that the requirement of consideration is met,
and even rarer the transaction in which, with a little good legal advice,
any lingering doubt cannot be dispelled.5 2
In commercial transactions this claim rings true.53 In marginal
transactions where values in the apparent swap are disproportionate and
the promisor has limited information or choice, however, the courts may
search for a real bargain rather than simply infer it. 54 This claim is also
consistent with the thorough research of Professor Mark B. Wessman,
who assumes that the presence of consideration for a promise is
"presumptively a sufficient reason to enforce the promise" (subject to
Fairness themes) but argues that it is wrong to conclude that
"consideration is a necessary condition for the enforcement of a
55
promise, i.e., that only bargain promises should be enforced.
c. The Enigma and its Surrogate
Farnsworth, however, does not believe that promises made in a
"sham" exchange should be enforced under the consideration rubric.
51. Id. at 50. In some illuminating passages on the decline of the intention principle,
Farnsworth disputes Holmes's suggestion that "consideration is as much a form as a seal." Id. at
53 (citing Knell v. Codman, 28 N.E. 578 (Mass. 1891)). With a seal, a promisor can go through a
convenient ritual of affixing a seal, "but a promisor cannot make a binding commitment today by
going through the motions of a sham bargain." Id.
52. See id. at 54.
53. For example, consideration is not an explicit requirement for contracts for the sale of
goods under either the Uniform Commercial Code or the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See U.C.C. § 2-204 to 209 (1978); CISG Art. 1424. Under the U.C.C., consideration is implicit in the definition of "agreement" as the "bargain in
fact" of the parties. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3). Further, the concept of a sale is recognized as the
"passing of title [to goods] from the seller to the buyer for a price." Id. § 2-106(1).
54. A perfect example is Bogigian v. Bogigian, where a spouse contested the claim that she
had released a valuable lien on real estate granted in a divorce settlement in exchange for a
release of the mortgage on that real estate when the property was sold without a deficiency. See
Bogigian v. Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The majority voided the
release because the alleged consideration was not "actually" bargained for. See id. at 1152-53.
The dissent argued that the consideration "flowed from the bargain" and actual bargaining was
not required, especially where there was no evidence of fraud. Id.; see also Comment, The
Peppercorn Theory of Consideration and the Doctrine of Fair Exchange in Contract Law, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 1090, 1092 (1935) (arguing that value disparity in an exchange is supportable
where the promisor "both knew and desired such disparity").
55. Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of
Consideration,29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 713 (1996). Professor Wessman argues that if the
promise is not supported by consideration, the court should not use the consideration requirement
as a "gatekeeper" for the enforcement of other promises. See id. at 845.
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Rather, he argues that the doctrine of consideration is attenuated
because it is so easy to find a real bargain, even where there are mixed
motives, and that the reliance principle is also attenuated because, in
theory at least, it is possible to bargain for a peppercorn in exchange for
a promise to pay $1,000. In most cases, however, the promisor will
bargain for definite and substantial reliance in return. This reliance,
which is the price of the promise, may be in the form of action or
forbearance or a promise to act or forbear. The former cases pose no
problems for the reliance principle because the action or forbearance
will occur before the dispute arises. The latter cases, where the
promisor bargains for a return promise, create the enigma. How can a
reliance principle be justified if the promisor reneges before the return
promise has been performed? Put differently, how can a wholly
unperformed and thus unrelied upon return promise be squared with the
theory that enforceability "should be based upon reliance rather than
56
assent?
Farnsworth's answer is that the return promise (the "assent"
principle) is a surrogate for hidden reliance in the form of difficult to
prove opportunities not taken, which plausibly occur between the time
the promise is made and the dispute. In short, a "bright-line" test based
upon assent is a surrogate for hidden reliance.
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the claims of reliance that
should be accepted without proof are those that are hard to prove because negative and those that are plausible because of the availability
of similar substitutes. Choosing the moment of assent produces a
bright-line rule that binds the promisor at the earliest moment that the
promisee could possibly have a claim based
on such reliance. Reli57
ance before assent would not be justifiable.

56. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 61.
57. Id. at 59. The author illustrates this point by discussing the case of Lucy v. Zehmer, 84
S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954), where the parties laboriously created a written agreement to sell Zehmer's
land in a bar just before Christmas. See id. at 518. Just after the writing was signed, Lucy
tendered $5 to seal the bargain and Zehmer rejected it, stating that he had made his offer to sell as
a joke. See id. Lucy left the bar insisting that they had a deal and made preparations the next day
to finance the transaction. See id. Despite conflicting evidence, the Supreme Court of Appeals
found that Lucy was told for the first time that Zehmer was not serious the next day after reliance
and, reversing the trial court, held that the contract was enforceable. See id. at 522. The "bright
line" test advocated by Professor Farnsworth, therefore, would apply only if the Supreme Court
of Appeals found that Lucy knew of the joke within seconds after the writing was signed. Cf.
Malcolm P. Sharp, Mr. Justice Holmes: Some Modern Views-Contracts, 31 U. CHI. L. REV.
268, 272-73 (1964) (arguing that in light of the costs to individual freedom the objective test
should be employed only where the promisor carelessly used language that induced actual and
justified reliance by the promisee).
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On balance, Farnsworth believes that the defendant should not be
given an opportunity to rebut by showing that no reliance in fact
occurred: "[o]n the whole it is easier for a court to determine whether
there has been assent than to determine whether there has been reliance
or the absence of reliance." 58 Moreover, he argues that tenuous claims
of possible lost opportunities are as persuasive as the attenuated
doctrine of consideration. For these reasons, the bright-line rule is
justified.
d. Hedging Your Bets
Most promises are made as part of a bargain even though, according
to the author, the reason for enforcing them is either reliance or assent
as a surrogate for reliance. To what extent can a promisor at the time
the bargain is made hedge her bets and, thus, control subsequent regret
without making an illusory promise? 59 To the extent that the hedge is
limited, a promise has been made even though it reserves more
6
discretion over performance to one party than to the other. 0
In Chapter 10, the author explores several hedge techniques, such as
conditions of satisfaction, commitments to use reasonable efforts, and
terminations clauses. The author also considers what contract law has
done to limit their exercise, such as imposing a duty of good faith and a
requirement of reasonable notice before termination. Discussing notice
or "warning" requirements in particular, he illustrates how these
limitations do more than simply hold the deal together. In fact, the
limitations provide limited protection to parties who rely on promises
containing hedges that may or may not be invoked.
In addition to warning requirements, Farnsworth develops an
"evenhandedness" principle that also limits the termination of a contract
for reasons other than the other party's breach. In short, if the promisor
properly terminates or is excused from a contract, promisees affected by
the decision, both before and after the termination, must be treated in
the same way. Within the affected class, the promisor cannot favor one

58. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 60. The author states that the assent rule is one of
substance not form and discusses three other situations where assent is used as a surrogate for
reliance. See id. at 62-65.
59. An illusory promise, of course, is not a promise and would fail as either an offer or an
acceptance.
60. A commitment with a limited hedge is a promise that provides the necessary assent. See
Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank, 645 P.2d 727, 729 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)
(condition of satisfaction limited by duty of good faith). In these cases, mutuality of obligation is
not required. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(c) (198 1).
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affected party over another. 61 Similarly, if a government agency
contracts with a group of private parties and promises special treatment
in exchange for their taking over of insolvent financial institutions and
the promise is made impossible to perform by a subsequent act of
Congress, the "evenhandedness" principle
requires that the subsequent
62
general.
and
"public
be
Congress
act by
C. Gift Promises
Suppose that A makes a promise in a signed writing to pay B $10,000
in thirty days. A states in the writing that she "intends to assume a legal
obligation." Five days later A repudiates the promise because there has
been an unexpected illness in the family and the promised funds are
needed at home. Is A's promise binding and, if so, what is B's remedy?
If A's motive is purely altruistic (no swap) and there is no induced
reliance 63 or prior benefit conferred, the gift promise is not enforceable.
This is true unless a court is persuaded to adopt the Restatement's
exception for "charitable subscriptions," 64 or to embrace the intention
principle that makes binding a gift promise where the promisor has
expressed an intention to assume a legal obligation.
At this point, Professor Farnsworth becomes an advocate for the
intention principle. He believes that the "abolition of the seal without
the substitution of some other formality [was] rash, 65 and that the use of
some legally recognized formality would avoid the enforcement
difficulties posed in connection with the search for reliance or past
benefits conferred. 66 Without legislative intervention to provide an
appropriate formality, however, the courts will have to recognize the
61. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 105-08.
62. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 891 (1996). Even though the act of
Congress was public and general, the Winstar Court concluded that the agency making the
promise was held to the same standards as if it were a private party and those standards dictated
that the contracting agency was not excused by the subsequent public and general act. See id. at
891-95.
63. A recent student Comment suggests that despite current Restatement section 90, which
requires only that the promise "induce ...action or forbearance," the cases still require that the
promise induce "definite and substantial" reliance, a requirement of section 90 of the First
Restatement of Contracts. Gerald Griffin Reidy, Comment, Definite and Substantial Reliance:
Remedying Injustice Under Section 90, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1217, 1217-19 (1998).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981) (stating that a "charitable
subscription ...is binding under Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or
forbearance"); FARNSWORTH, supra note 1,at 78-79 (reporting that the exception has had mixed
reviews in the courts).
65. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 82.
66. See id. at 83. The author finds support for the intention principle in the doctrine of
"estoppel by deed." See id. at 83-84.
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promisor's expressed intention to assume a legal obligation. And even
if they do, a new set of complications will arise. First, the courts will
have to rethink the objective standard used in contract interpretation
because the intention of only one person is involved, the promisor.
Thus, a subjective test will be required. 67 Moreover, questions will
arise about when a promisor bound by the intention principle can renege
on the promise: "excuses must be fashioned if courts are to enforce
more promises to make gifts." 68 The excuses, according to the author,
may be provided in the promise itself, such as by a condition, or adapted
from the excuse doctrines when a swap is involved, depending on
whether or not time plays a role. 69 After discussing some possibilities,
Farnsworth concedes that a "coherent set of answers has yet to be
developed in the United States" but predicts that if the legal system
recognizes the intention principle (more liability), its expansion will
"depend on the fashioning of excuses to take account of regret."7
In sum, the intention principle is a strong version of the Autonomy
theme. Enforcing such a promise is not necessarily Efficient, that is, the
welfare maximizing utility of enforcement is not clear. It is not
necessary to prevent injustice to the promisee, although expectations are
created and hidden reliance is always a possibility. Even though the
intention principle trumps paternalism as a restraint on the power to
assume legal obligations, paternalistic (Fairness) considerations return if
the promise was based upon a mistake or subsequent circumstances
create improvidence. The tension here, therefore, is between Autonomy
and the same types of Fairness considerations that mitigate against
enforcing some promises in a bargain.
D. The Strength of Commitment: Remedies
1. The Remedial Interests
When a binding promise is breached without justification, section
344 of the Restatement, Second, recognizes three remedial interests of
the promisee that the courts might protect. The first is "expectation,"
which is the interest of putting the plaintiff in "as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed."-7 1 This remedy is
consistent with the Efficiency themes in the consideration requirement.

67. See id. at 84-85.
68. Id. at 85.

69. See id. at 85-88; see also id. at 18-27.
70. Id. at 88.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981).
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From the plaintiff's standpoint, specific performance does this the best,
but damages for loss of bargain are a substitution for specific relief.
The second is "reliance," which protects losses caused by reliance on
the contract by putting the plaintiff "in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract not been made." 72 This remedy is
consistent with the Fairness themes associated with Restatement,
Second, section 90. The third is "restitution," which is the plaintiff's
"interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on
the other party." 73 One or more of these interests may be protected in a
breach of contract. 74 Which one should be preferred? Should the
answer turn on the reason given for enforcing the promise in the first
place?
2. Farnsworth's Analysis
Professor Farnsworth has doubts about the strength of the remedies
available for breach of contract. He asserts that there are a "variety of
rules of contract law [that] operate to soften the commitments of
promisors." 75 Then he discusses a "cascading array of remedies," both
specific and substitutional, which demonstrate that the purpose of
76
contract remedies is to compensate for loss-not to deter breach.
Because compensation, not punishment, is the goal, he then suggests
that the common law's preference for substitutional rather than specific
remedies is consistent with the often criticized doctrine of "efficient
breach." This doctrine, in effect, compensates the promisee in damages
for the expectation loss to the promise but leaves the promisor free to
keep any gain in excess of compensation made through the breach. 7 7

72. Id. § 344(b).
73. Id. § 344(c).
74. In a leading case, Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973), a surgeon, without
negligence, breached a contract to achieve a particular cosmetic result. See id. at 184. The
plaintiff elected not to pursue a claim for expectation damages. See id. at 185. Instead, the court
upheld an award that included restitution of the fee paid to the surgeon, reliance expenditures paid
to the hospital, and elements of pain and suffering and mental anguish. See id. at 189.
75. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 110.
76. Id. at 109-12. But see William S.Dodge, The Casefor Punitive Damages in Contracts,48
DUKE L.J. 629 (1999) (arguing that economic efficiency supports the allowance of punitive
damages for any willful breach of contract).
77. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 113-14. Note that restitution is limited to recovery of
gains conferred by the promisee on the promisor and does not include gains made by the promisor
over and above the compensation paid for breach. See id. at 116-18. The courts have rejected the
argument that the efficient breach thesis explains why there should be a preference for awarding
expectation and not punitive damages. See Craig S. Warkol, Note, Resolving the Paradox
Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach,
20 CARDOZO L. REv. 321, 352-53 (1998).
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Thus, if the breach is deliberate but efficient, the claim for specific
performance should be denied.78
Having offered an efficiency explanation for the denial of specific
performance, he then seems to accept the "conventional answer" that
expectation damages are justified because they protect hidden reliance,
i.e., reliance in the form of lost opportunities that are hard to prove. 79 In
fact, for promises made in bargains "the expectation measure is a
perfect surrogate for the reliance measure... ."80 For Farnsworth,
however, this does not mean that the reliance measure should always
trump expectation recovery in gift promises that are enforceable
because of reliance (due to the probability of hidden reliance). Further,
this does not mean that the reliance measure should always limit
expectation recovery for breach of promises enforceable without
consideration or reliance, such as a promise enforceable (hypothetically)
under the intention principle or a promise enforceable under the
Restatement's exception for charitable subscriptions. 8 1 Finally, the
expectation interest in a promise that is enforceable because of a past
benefit conferred should be limited to the extent that the value of the
promise exceeds the value of the past benefit.
With all due respect, Professor Farnsworth's analysis here is thin and
not very persuasive. Assume that the promisee of a binding and
breached promise seeks specific performance or is able to prove with
reasonable certainty the value of the promised performance. If
limitations on proof, foreseeability, causation and mitigation are
satisfied, who is to say that the promisee's choice of expectation should
not be honored? Obviously, the burden shifts to the promisor to
establish that specific performance should be denied or the expectation
remedy should be limited to reliance or restitution. Even though those
limitations are possible to establish, there is an insufficient treatment in
this book of the cases and legal literature to feel comfortable with the
thesis that the strength of remedies for breach of a binding promise is
limited, and perhaps properly so.
78. Not all advocates of economic analysis agree. See, e.g., Allan Schwartz, The Case for
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (stating that "the remedy of specific performance
should be routinely available as the damages remedy in the case of breach"); Thomas Ulen, The
Efficiency of Specific Performance:Toward a Unified Theory of ContractRemedies, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 341, 343 (1984) (arguing that "specific performance is more likely than any form of money
damages to achieve efficiency in the exchange and breach of reciprocal promises").
79. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 115. The author relies upon the work of Professor
Melvin A. Eisenberg, whose work, in turn, is derived from the seminal work of Professor Lon A.
Fuller.
80. Id.
81. Seeid. at 115-16.
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III.

RELINQUISHMENTS AND PRECLUSIONS

A. Introduction
In the first part of the book, Farnsworth argues that promisors should
have power under the intention principle to create a binding promise by
expressing an intention to assume legal obligations. This power is
denied under current law due to the abolition of the seal and the failure
of legislatures to supply a substitute formality. This result is explained
and sometimes criticized by the author on the grounds of legal
paternalism, which is used "broadly to include limitations that the law
imposes on a person's control over the future for that person's own
good, usually in the context of the extent of a person's freedom to make
a commitment that will be irrevocable or a relinquishment or preclusion
that will be irreversible."8 2 Thus, legal paternalism should not be
invoked to deny power to make a binding gift promise, although
paternalistic concerns are involved in deciding when the promisor may
renege because the promise was based upon mistake or coercion when
83
made or because personal priorities change over time.
In the second part of the book, the focus is on the present rather than
the future. The question for the author is not whether a promise is
binding, but whether a relinquishment or preclusion is irreversible even
though there has been no consideration or reliance. For example,
consider what the author calls relinquishments: When is performance
under a contract, or delivery of a gift, or cancellation of a debt, or
waiver of a condition irreversible? The answer is found in the intention
principle (Autonomy) which, because time is not a factor, now trumps
the reliance principle. Moreover, there is less reason for legal
paternalism to block power in a relinquishment because the
relinquishing party is more competent to order the present than predict
the future and, significantly, cannot relinquish more than she has. Thus,
for example, the expressed intention to relinquish a right by making a
gift or to preclude subsequent action by representing a fact to be true
should have legal effect, subject to a limited range of paternalistic
defenses.
In the final five chapters on preclusions, the author notes the reemergence of the reliance principle, the inapplicability of the intention
principle, and the emergence of a set of new principles associated with
82. Id. at 3 & 207 n.5. Again, this is the only place in the book where a definition of
paternalism is offered. See supra note 31 (citing other sources that thoroughly discuss
paternalism).
83. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1,at 86-88.
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preclusions. These are: the "anti-speculation" principle, the "public
84
interest" principle, and the "repose" principle.
B. Relinquishments

The starting point with most relinquishments is that they are
irreversible. There is no promise to relinquish. A seller who
performs, 85 a party who delivers a gift,8 6 or a party who waives a

contractual condition,87 cannot later reverse that decision. This starting
point, irreversibility, is, according to the author, rooted in the intention
principle, as augmented by other policies. On the other hand, the
relinquishment of a debt owed by a renunciation, i.e., a statement in
writing that the debt is discharged, is reversible unless there is
consideration. Why should this be?
According to the author, 88 because of the reliance and "consent"
principles, the consideration requirement has waned where the creation

of a binding promise is involved, but it remains vigorous in the law of
discharge. In short, the rule of Foakes v. Beer 89 is alive and well in the
United States. True, a liquidated debt can be discharged in exchange
for a peppercorn, but otherwise the consideration requirement here is in
stark contrast to the intention principle and to the treatment of discharge

84. See id. at 124.
85. See id. at 127-31. A relinquishment by performance is not reversible even though there is
no reliance by the party to whom relinquishment was made. See id. at 127. The reason is the
intention principle, subject to evidence that the promisor was unfairly influenced or uninformed.
See id. at 129-31. The potential reliance of third persons, however, gives rise to a "public
interest" principle that supports finality. See id. at 131.
86. See id. at 132-42. In this chapter, the author discusses when a gift is delivered and why it
is irrevocable. See id. Again, the intention principle coupled with the fact that the donor can give
no more than she has supports finality. See id. at 133. After particularly insightful discussions of
self-declared trusts, constructive delivery, and assignments, Professor Farnsworth returns to his
major thesis, which is that under the intention principle, a signed and delivered writing, declaring
a relinquishment of something owned at that time, ought to be sufficient delivery of the things
and a paternalistic judge might agree. See id. at 140. In Chapter 14, he extends that thesis to
commitments to give future assets. See id. at 143-47. After discussing the difficulties of selling
or assigning expected future resources, he argues that there should be no difference under the
intention principle between a renunciation by gift of what one has and what one will have,
because in either case one can give only what one has or will have. See id. at 146-47.
87. See id. at 154-62. Why should the renunciation of a condition in a contract be irreversible
event though there is not consideration or reliance? When the condition is not promised by the
other party, the answer lies in several reinforcing factors, such as the non-materiality of the
condition, the potential for forfeiture if the condition is enforced and the pressures for adjustment
in continuing relationships. See id. at 156-58.
88. See id. at 148-53.
89. Foakes v. Beer, L.R. 9 A.C. 605 (H.L. 1884). This rule states that a debt cannot be
discharged by payment of a lesser sum.

2000]

Changing Your Mind

in the civil law. 90 In the final analysis, the author urges courts to adopt
the intention principle and to apply it consistently, without the need for
consideration or reliance where there is: (1) a promise to make a gift;
(2) a delivered gift; and (3) the discharge by renunciation of a debt.9 1
C. Preclusions
In the concluding chapters, the author considers when a person is
precluded by a voluntary act, such as the rejection of an offer, from
subsequently asserting facts or a condition inconsistent with the
preclusion. For example, if A rejects B's offer, A can no longer accept
that offer without further assent by B. 92 Or if B, an infant, elects to
ratify a contract with A, B can no longer avoid the contract for
93

infancy.

In preclusions, the conduct is voluntary but there is usually no
intention to give up anything. The preclusion is inadvertent and, thus,
the intention principle and its arch enemy, legal paternalism, do not
apply. As the author puts it: "While relinquishment results in a
surrender that you once intended, preclusion results in a surrender that
you never intended." 94 The reliance principle, however, returns to
center stage, particularly where equitable estoppel or laches are
involved. 95 But in preclusions, the reliance principle may be trumped
by other policies, such as the immunity of the United States from
equitable estoppel despite reliance, 96 and, in certain preclusions,

90. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 149-52. The author finds some inroads into the
consideration requirement in the Uniform Commercial Code. See id. at 152.
91. This avoids an anomaly found in the following problem. A and B enter into a bilateral
contract where A is to deliver goods to B for $50,000. B then gives A a signed writing that says
"I renounce my right to the goods (as yet undelivered) and make you a gift of them." The gift is
effective as a relinquishment, but can A still enforce the promise to pay $50,000? Farnsworth
says:
If so, this would seem to be a scheme by which [B] could in effect make a commitment
to make a fit of that sum to [A], an apparently anomalous result. If, however, as I have
urged, the same formality would have sufficed for a gratuitous promise in the first
place, the anomaly disappears.
Id. at 153.

92. See id. at 174-80.
93. This is an example of preclusion by election. See id. at 181-92. Farnsworth clarifies:
"[b]ut preclusions, like relinquishments, are fundamentally different from commitments, and
equitable estoppel, which results in preclusion, is fundamentally different from promissory
estoppel, which results in commitment." Id. at 170.

94. Id. at 164.
95. See id. at 163-73. The reliance principle is also at work in preclusions by rejection. See
id. at 174-80.

96. See id. at 167-70.
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policies other than reliance may dictate finality. For example, in
preclusion by election, reliance or formality play no role in the
irreversible choice. 97 Rather, finality may be supported by an anti98
speculation principle or the public interest in finality.
To summarize, suppose that in a ten year lease between A and B, B
promised to maintain the premises in good repair provided that A gave
prompt notice of needed repairs. Under the author's analysis, the
following results might be expected.
First, if B stated to A, "I hereby renounce the notice condition," there
would be a relinquishment by waiver to which the intention principle
should apply even though there was no consideration or no reliance.
Second, if, after A failed in the third year to give timely notice of
repair needs, B repaired anyway, there would be a preclusion by
election. B could not thereafter assert the failed notice condition as a
defense even though the preclusion was not intended and there was no
reliance.
Third, if after B elected not to insist on the notice condition in the
third year, B promised not to insist upon the notice condition in the
future, there would be a commitment rather than a renunciation or a
preclusion. The commitment falls under the intention principle but
would probably be binding if A relied upon it.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, this is a book about the tension between the
intention principle (Autonomy) and the reliance principle (Fairness). In
resolving this tension, Efficiency themes are either muted or ignored.
Moreover, the book does not pretend to cover the entire domain of
contract 99 and makes little effort to apply or critique the plethora of
theories about contract that have waxed and occasionally waned over
the last fifty years. l0 0 Rather, Professor Farnsworth draws upon some

97. See id. at 183.
98. These principles are skillfully developed and applied in Chapter 19. See id. at 181-92.
99. See Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.
254, 254 (1995) (discussing three parts of the contract domain: contract in fact, contract law, and

contract theory).
100. For such an effort, see HILLMAN, supra note 3. But see Randy E. Barnett, The Richness
of ContractTheory, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (1999) (critically reviewing HILLMAN, supra note 3).
Professor Barnett's criticisms of Hillman focus on Hillman's alleged failures: (1) to devote
enough attention to his (Barnett's) theories; (2) to read enough cases on promissory estoppel; and
(3) to consider what, in addition to a promise and induced reliance, must be present for liability.
See Barnett, supra, at 1420-22. Although it is for him to say, my guess is that Professor Barnett

2000]

Changing Your Mind

of these theories in a highly eclectic manner to support his argument
while using a unitary and relatively simplistic concept of paternalism as
a foil throughout the book.
Although the first part of the book involves a sophisticated treatment
of some aspects of the law of contracts, the objective appears to be to
rework familiar arguments rather than to break new ground. People
have a choice to promise or not. Promises, when made, can be
conditioned to limit reliance by promisees. Promises are binding,
however, when they bargain for or induce reasonable reliance (Fairness)
by the promisee, although in a bargain, limited defenses based upon
mistake, fraud, or duress will be recognized (Paternalism). In this part
of the book, the reliance principle trumps the intention principle in that
a promise is binding because of bargained for or induced reliance not
because the promisor intended to assume legal obligations. Thus,
reliance (Fairness) is a surrogate for intention (Autonomy) once the
promise is made. More importantly, the promisee's return promise
(assent) in a bargain is a surrogate for actual reliance and, in remedies
for breach of contract, the expectation interest is a surrogate for hidden
reliance. Implicit in this surrogacy triad is the notion that if the freedom
to renege on a promise is limited by the reliance principle, the consistent
legal protection of reliance, actual or hidden, will support Efficiency
themes.
Where gift promises or relinquishments are made, however, Professor
Farnsworth becomes an advocate for law reform. The intention
principle should prevail without the need for reliance where a person
has expressed an intention to create or change legal relationships in a
gift promise or by relinquishment. Autonomy is thus freed from the
restraints of paternalism but not from the consequences of mistake or
improvidence. The person to whom the promise or relinquishment is
made may with the requisite intent count on finality without having to
prove consideration or induced reliance. In preclusions, however, the
intention principle retreats into the background and the reliance
principle re-emerges as the controlling factor. The arguments and
policies developed in these settings are sophisticated and extremely
persuasive. In many respects, they complement the law of regretted
decisions when promises are made and clearly integrate some of the
disparate issues in and around contract law.

would level the same three criticisms at Professor Farnsworth, especially regarding the theory that
a manifested intention to assume legal obligations is not needed when a promise induces reliance.
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Nevertheless, I am disappointed in Part One of the book. Like many
law professors from my generation, I am a realist 10 in that I believe that
contract law should respond to the behavior of people who make
promises and enter bargains and to the context within which that
activity occurs. 10 2 Moreover, I have incorporated relational contract
theory into my work 10 3 and have tried to be sensitive to the fairness
themes involved in consumer protection, if not the more radical
premises of critical legal theory. 1°4 Based upon this book, it is not clear
to me whether Professor Farnsworth is a realist or something else.
Clearly, he does not like relational theory and hides the problems of
consumer protection behind his persistently stated aversion to legal
paternalism.
If Professor Farnsworth is not a realist in the tradition of Llewellyn
and Corbin, rejects relational theory, does not explicitly embrace
efficiency themes, and, except for bargained for or induced reliance,
holds fairness at bay, exactly where does he stand? Only he can say for
sure. From this reviewer's perspective, I see a formalist at work. But
what kind of formalist? The intention principle, which draws heavily
on Lon L. Fuller's work on legal formalities, 10 5 tries to restore the
earlier function of the seal by validating a substitute-the expressed
intention to assume legal obligations. Thus, form here channels
behavior and enhances Autonomy. It is not an example of the "old"
formalism that tended to separate law from morality and exalted rules
for their own sake 106 or the so-called "new" formalism, which according
to Cass Sunstein, is an "intriguing blend of realist and formalist
arguments which might increase predictability for all concerned, [and]

101. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 382 (1973)
(stating "realism is dead; we are all realists"). But see Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:
Toward a NaturalizedJurisprudence,76 TEx. L. REV. 267, 314-15 (1997) (questioning whether
many people understand what it means to be a realist).
102. See Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786-92 (1982) (discussing the difference between theory-based rules and
practically-applied standards in contract law, and maintaining that while the RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS focused on the former, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
concentrates on the latter).
103. See Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
789 (1993); see also supra note 27 (describing relational contract theory).
104. The combination of realism, relational theory, and fairness themes are important
ingredients in critical legal theory. See Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465,
467-69 (1988) (discussing the relationship between realism and formalism).
105. See Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
106. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defensor Fidei: The Travails of a Post-Realist Formalist,47
FLA. L. REV. 815, 818 (1995) (painting a sympathetic portrait of legal formalism); Singer, supra
note 104, at 474 (discussing a narrow view of legal relations, which embraces "old formalism").
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in the process greatly decrease the costs of decisions."' 10 7 No, Professor
Farnsworth turns to the past for a distinct brand of formalism and, in the
limited domain covered by this book, offers it as a theory for the future.
Only time will tell whether the intention principle or any traditional
contract doctrine can meet the demands of the complex exchange
relationships that characterize the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries.

107. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636,
644 (1999); see also David Chamy, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842
(1999).

